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Abstract  
We examine cumulative abnormal returns of mergers and acquisitions in the computer industry 
over a twenty-day event window surrounding merger announcement. Our findings indicate that 
acquirers, on average, are generally not able to capture statistically significant cumulative 
abnormal returns over this event window, while targets are able to capture large, positive 
statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns. We find that the premium paid by acquirers 
and in turn received by targets possesses explanatory merit with regards to both acquirer and 
target cumulative abnormal returns. Additionally, our results reveal that when improvement of 
marketing capabilities is a stated rationale for pursuing a merger, it has statistically significantly  
explanatory power of target cumulative abnormal returns.    
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I. Introduction 
Our study attempts to answer the question – what ex-ante characteristics of mergers and 
acquisitions in the computer industry lead to the greatest short-run increases in equity values? A 
couple of research findings make this question interesting for study and may provide unique 
rationales that motivate merger and acquisition activity in the computer industry. Specifically, 
Bothner’s finding (2005) that “…relative size has a strong positive effect on future growth…” 
implies that firms in the computer industry that enhance their relative size, on average, may be 
able to augment their sales growth. Additionally, Bayus, Erickson, and Jacobson’s (2003) finding 
that new product introductions in the personal computer industry enhance firm profitability by 
increasing firm profit rates and size provides a possible explanation for the industry’s 
comparatively high rate of technological innovation.    
A firm seeking to capitalize on the sales growth benefit it derives from increasing its 
relative size or the profitability benefit it gains from introducing new products may find a merger 
or acquisition to be the optimal means of achieving its ends. Although organic growth may also 
serve as a means of attaining these benefits, and may be especially attractive to both those firms 
which have reservations about their capacity to effectively integrate new businesses within their 
existing management structures and to those that are generally skeptical of structuring an M&A 
transaction, it typically has features which some firms may find unattractive. In particular, a 
given firm may find the time required to organically grow prohibitive and/or simply lack the 
expertise needed to organically grow.  
For example, a US hardware producer which seeks to increase its relative size and 
product offerings by launching a new software product in Asian markets will likely need to open 
new Asian offices, secure new avenues of distribution, hire new staff, develop a branding and 
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positioning strategy, et cetera, processes which will likely take a few years. Further, the US 
hardware producer must also develop the expertise to produce software products targeted at 
Asian consumers, something the firm may find to be exceptionally difficult because it does not 
fall within the realm of its core competency. In the meantime, a competitor with the same desire 
as the US hardware producer who completes a timely acquisition of an Asian software maker 
may be able to preempt the hardware producer’s entry into the Asian software market, since an 
acquisition will neither require time to secure distribution in Asian markets, open new regional 
offices, hire new staff, et cetera nor require development of software expertise. Through 
preemption the rival becomes the first to capture the relative size and new product introduction 
benefits present in the industry, placing the hardware producer at a competitive disadvantage.  
The industry may also provide acquirers with another unique benefit to engaging in a 
merger or acquisition. That is, by making a given acquisition, acquirers may be able to adversely 
affect the stock prices of their rivals. Akhigbe and Martin (2002) find for example that 
acquisitions by Microsoft in the Internet/online-services segment of the computer industry 
negatively impacted the rival Internet/online-services portfolio’s stock prices. Because of this 
and the aforedescribed potential benefits that may be derived through a merger or acquisition, the 
computer industry is rife with merger and acquisition activity, providing us with rich data for 
analysis but limiting our study to the short-term. The statistical problem with performing a long-
run analysis of equity values is that there is generally a succession of merger and acquisition 
transactions for each acquirer, making it difficult to untangle the long-run effects of each 
particular merger or acquisition.  
To examine the question motivating our study based on the above research findings we 
develop various hypotheses which are grounded in the notion that certain characteristics of 
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mergers and acquisitions in the computer industry will, on balance, be statistically significant 
generators of short term value. The data used to test our hypothesis mostly comes from press 
releases, internet sources, SEC filings, Wharton Research Data Services, and Yahoo Finance. 
Our study makes use of twenty-seven mergers and acquisitions in the hardware, software, and 
networking sectors of the computer industry. For our procedure, we employ the event study 
methodology over a twenty-day event window to compute cumulative abnormal returns for 
targets and acquirers. Not only do we test these cumulative abnormal returns for statistical 
significance from zero but we also attempt to identify those features of computer industry 
mergers and acquisitions that generate value in the short-term. We do the latter by regressing 
cumulative abnormal returns against various independent variables that are hypothesized to be 
value creators.  
Our findings indicate that acquirers, on balance, do not earn statistically significant 
cumulative abnormal returns, while targets do. The premium paid/received seems to have 
marginally significant explanatory merit for both acquirer and target cumulative abnormal 
returns while announcing marketing as a stated rationale for pursuing a merger seems to have 
statistically significant explanatory merit for target cumulative abnormal returns. Further, 
pursuing a merger in the 1997-1998 time period seems to be a marginally significant creator of 
short-term value for targets. We interpret our results to be in correspondence with existing cross-
industry studies on the subject, implying that short-term merger and acquisition value creation in 
the computer industry is generally not unique. Nevertheless, the statistical significance of 
pursuing marketing as a rationale in target acquisitions may be stem from how shareholders 
uniquely view computer industry targets. Future analysis may focus on explaining the 
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motivations for the statistical significance of some of our variables and extending our study to 
the long-run.          
II. Existing Literature 
It is generally a well know result that, on balance, mergers and acquisitions create 
positive, statistically significant short-term abnormal returns for targets and slightly negative 
abnormal returns for acquirers which are not statistically significant. For example, Andrade, 
Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) find large, statistically significant abnormal returns at the 5% 
significance level for targets when they use both one day event windows around merger 
announcement and event windows from twenty-days before announcement to merger closing. 
For acquirers, they find slightly negative abnormal returns that are not statistically significant 
under each of these event windows. These results, they explain, are consistent with earlier results 
from Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter (1988).  
By examining all targets and acquirers in the University of Chicago Center for Research 
in Security Prices mergers and acquisitions database from 1973 to 1998, Andrade et al do not 
focus their study results upon a single industry. As a result, to our knowledge, it remains an open 
question whether Andrade et al’s general results are applicable to the context of specific 
industries. Both Bayus, Erickson, and Jacobson’s and Bothner’s respective findings cited earlier 
imply that there are benefits to firm profitability in the personal computer industry from new 
product introductions and to sales growth from relative size increases, implying that acquirers 
may be able derive distinctive benefits from mergers and acquisitions in the computer industry 
pursued for these purposes. If this were to be the case, and if acquirers did not, on balance, 
overpay for these added benefits, then they may capture statistically significant, positive value 
from mergers and acquisitions in the computer industry, which Andrade et al show is not the 
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case for mergers at large. Our results, discussed in more detail below, are consistent with 
Andrade et al’s findings given we find that acquirers on balance do not have statistically 
significant cumulative abnormal returns while targets do. A further component of our study is to 
use regression analysis to identify features of mergers that explain acquirer and target cumulative 
abnormal returns.    
III. Hypothesis 
  After examining relevant press releases and other articles for twenty-seven select mergers 
and acquisitions in the computer industry, we identified six rationales firms state for merging. 
These rationales are product expansion or enhancement, cost synergies or economies of scale, 
increase in size or capabilities of the firm, value chain enhancement, improvement of marketing 
capabilities, and new market entry. Because product expansion or enhancement and increase is 
the size or capabilities of the firm are the only rationales for merging which respectively yield 
enhanced profitability and sales growth benefits in accordance with Bayus et al’s and Bothner’s 
previously cited findings, we hypothesize that these merger rationales, ceteris paribus, will drive 
the highest increases in acquirer and target equity values over a short event window around 
merger announcement, relative to each of the other rationales. We expect that the four other 
stated rationales for merging will not lead to as great of an increase in short term equity values 
because we have not found evidence showing that they have the potential to yield enhanced 
benefits in the computer industry. Importantly, the failure of the product development and 
increase in size/capabilities rationales to yield statistically significant short-term value would not 
necessarily contradict previous findings that new product introductions and relative size 
increases generate benefits. Rather, it might simply indicate that the market is not aware of these 
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findings and as such does not anticipate potential benefits that may accrue from mergers with 
these rationales and price them into short-term equity valuations.            
Additionally, we expect mergers where lower premiums (by premium we mean the 
difference between offer price and target equity value) are anticipated to create relatively higher 
increases in acquirer equity values and relatively lower increases in target equity values, with the 
opposite holding true as well. The logic motivating this is that, ceteris paribus, the lower the 
premium paid by the acquirer, the lower the value paid out of the firm, and the lower the value 
paid out of the firm, the higher the equity value retained within the firm. Analogously, the lower 
the premium received by the target, the lower value paid into the firm, and the lower the value 
paid into the firm, the lower the equity value infused into the firm.        
We examine three different sectors of the computer industry – hardware, networking, and 
software and hypothesize that mergers which are undertaken for diversification purposes (i.e. 
which have the purpose of diversifying by introducing new products or entering new markets) in 
the software segment of the computer industry will generate the greatest short-term value since 
software firms generally can diversify at the lowest cost. For example, if a software firm seeks to 
diversify its product line by launching a new product, it may acquire another, smaller software 
firm that is particularly adept at research and development to assist in this endeavor. After the 
combined firm develops a new product, the marginal cost of producing that product is negligible 
as it essentially comprises the value of the disk on which the software is produced. Further, 
should the firm wish to geographically diversify by selling its new product in new markets, it 
faces relatively low product transport costs as it is only required to transport several small disks 
for sale in its new market.   
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Conversely, hardware and networking firms which make acquisitions for similar 
purposes face higher costs in diversifying. A hardware firm that acquires another hardware 
producer with particular research and development expertise to design a new line of computers 
faces higher marginal costs as it must assemble the new computer’s keyboard, screen, CPU, 
circuitry, et cetera. Further, transporting several computers to new markets will certainly come at 
greater cost than transporting several small disks. Consequently, we expect product and 
geographic diversification to generally come at greater cost for hardware firms than they do for 
software firms. 
 Similarly, a networking firm that acquires another networking firm to design a new line 
of network switches faces higher marginal costs, as it must engineer the switch’s mechanics, 
circuitry, et cetera. Moreover, in addition to traditional transportation costs to new markets the 
networking firm may face costs to overcome lack of infrastructural development in rural areas or 
undeveloped nations. For example, a rural area or undeveloped nation may have plenty of 
computer and software users though lack the infrastructural development to support a network or 
the internet, meaning network switches will have little value in such a market unless the 
networking firm invests in facilitating the development of the necessary infrastructure. Thus, we 
anticipate that product and geographic diversification will generally come at greater cost for 
networking firms than they do for software firms.  
IV. Data 
Our data largely stems from company press releases, internet sources, and SEC filings 
which provide details on merger announcement dates, closing dates, transaction amounts, and 
rationales for merging. To find historical equity valuations we used Yahoo Finance and Wharton 
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Research Data Services. We compiled relevant data from these sources for twenty-seven mergers 
and acquisitions in the computer industry.   
V. Procedure and Methodology 
  To test our hypothesis we employ the event study methodology to define the dependent 
variable in our statistical analysis, define our independent variables from the data, then proceed 
with a multiple regression statistical procedure. Our single dependent variable shall be 
cumulative abnormal returns of equity values twenty days prior to and twenty days after our 
event, the announcement of each of our identified mergers. Cumulative abnormal returns refer to 
the difference between the real ex-post equity return before or after the occurrence of the event 
and the normal return which is anticipated in the absence of the event’s occurrence, aggregated 
over the window of the event study. To illustrate, the cumulative abnormal return on day positive 
two of our event window for a given merger announcement (signifying two days after the merger 
announcement) is the actual return on that day minus the expected return on that day in the case 
that the event did not occur, plus the sum of each of the values calculated in the same way for 
days negative twenty to positive one. Because the normal return calculation is a hypothetical 
estimation of what the actual return would have been absent the merger announcement, and 
hence unobservable, it has been estimated using four different techniques. This then gives us four 
different sets of cumulative abnormal returns for targets and for acquirers, each of which we 
regress against our sets of dependent variables, searching for statistical significance. Those 
variables that are statistically significant and invariant to the normal return estimation 
methodology are robust.  
 Specifically, the four techniques we use to compute normal returns involve an 
approximate one-year mean daily return from approximately one year prior to the announcement 
 12 
date, an approximate three-year daily mean return from approximately one year prior to the 
announcement date, a daily return predicted by the capital asset pricing model for approximately 
one year prior to the year of announcement, and an index daily return. The approximate one-year 
mean return from approximately one year prior to the announcement date was computed by 
taking the mean of all of the daily returns from approximately two years prior to the 
announcement date to approximately one year prior to the announcement date for a given target 
or acquirer. This number was then used as the normal return for each day in our twenty-day 
event window. Similarly, to compute an approximate three-year mean return from approximately 
one year prior to the announcement date, the mean of all the daily returns from approximately 
four years prior to the announcement date to approximately one year prior to the announcement 
date was taken for a given target or acquirer. This value was then utilized as the normal return 
for each day in our twenty-day event window.  
To approximate the normal return using the capital asset pricing model, the beta one year 
prior to the year of announcement was found for a given target or acquirer from Wharton 
Research Data Services. The annual market risk premium and risk free rate for that year were 
then found from the data library on Kenneth R. French’s website.1 Using this data and the capital 
asset pricing model equation: RI = Rf  + Вi(Rm-Rf) normal annual returns were derived. To 
convert these normal returns from annual form to daily form the number of trading days in each 
of the years prior to the year of announcement for each target and acquirer were found and used 
to de-annualize the annual normal returns into daily normal returns. This number was then 
respectively used for each target and acquirer as the normal return for each day in the twenty-day 
event window surrounding merger announcement. Finally, to estimate the normal return using 
the index method, the actual daily return from the AMEX Computer Technology Index for each 
                                                 
1
 It can be accessed at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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day in our twenty day event window was used as the normal return for that day, for each of our 
targets and acquirers. Using the actual daily return for each of the days in the twenty-day event 
window for each target and acquirer, we computed four sets of cumulative abnormal returns over 
the event window for each target and acquirer pursuant to the cumulative abnormal return 
calculation method described earlier.    
 Next, we identified the various independent variables that we anticipated would influence 
cumulative abnormal returns. Using the press releases and other articles we compiled in our 
dataset, we classified the rational or rationales motivating each merger into six categories – 
product expansion or enhancement, cost synergies or economies of scale, increase in size or 
capabilities of firm, value chain enhancement, improvement of marketing capabilities, or new 
market entry. Based on the products and services offered by the acquirer, we also classified each 
merger as occurring in the hardware, software, or networking segments of the computer industry. 
Further, given that we anticipated the premium expected to be paid in each transaction to 
influence the short-term value created by that transaction, we approximated the premium 
expected by the market upon announcement.  
To make this calculation, using data from Wharton Research Data Services, we took the 
number of shares outstanding of each target firm on day minus one of its event window (the day 
before merger announcement), multiplied the number of shares outstanding by the closing price 
on day minus one, then subtracted the result from the approximate transaction value for the 
merger listed in press releases and other articles. We used this method because we expect 
shareholders of a given acquirer or target to take note of the numerical being paid premium paid, 
as opposed to making a more complex premium calculation that involves normalizing the 
premium for size of the target being acquired. Nevertheless, to test the robustness of our 
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regression results we also ran each of our regressions with the premium value calculated above 
being normalized by the size of the target. It must be noted however that the focus of our 
analysis shall be on the regressions where premiums were not normalized by size of target.    
 Further, given the mercurial nature of mergers and acquisitions markets over periods of 
time, we expected that time period might play an important role in the short-term value created 
by a merger or acquisition. As such, given that our dataset of merger announcements spans from 
1995 to 2007 we computed years since 1995 for each transaction and further segmented each 
transaction into two-year time-intervals (1996-1996, 1997-1998, etc.). This allowed us to run two 
different sets of regressions under each of the four methods of calculating cumulative abnormal 
returns for both targets and acquirers (for a total of sixteen regressions). As mentioned, we ran 
these regressions again using an alternate (and in our opinion less correct) method of calculating 
premiums to check for robustness. Thus, we have a total of thirty-two regressions. For 
clarification, when we refer to the results of our regressions in the following sections we mean 
the results of the first sixteen regressions where premium is not normalized by size of target. Any 
references to the latter sixteen regressions will be made explicit. Further, the previous references 
to the results in earlier sections refer to the results of the first sixteen regressions.   
In the first set of regressions, each of the acquirer and target cumulative abnormal returns 
were regressed against the following independent variables: a variable for premium paid, a  
dummy variable for merger rationale 1 (0 if product expansion or enhancement was not a 
rationale for the merger, 1 if otherwise), similar dummy variables for merger rationales 3-6, 
dummy variables for industry segment (software, networking), and dummy variables for two-
year time intervals (1997-1998, 1999-2000, etc.). Notably, given that dummy variables are 
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relative, we omitted merger rationale 2 from the first set of dummy variables, hardware from the 
second set, and 1995-1996 from the third set.         
 In the second set of regressions we replaced the dummy variables for two-year time 
intervals with numerical variables that account for time. Each of the acquirer and target 
cumulative abnormal returns were regressed against the following independent variables: a 
variable for premium paid, a dummy variable for merger rationale 1(0 if product expansion or 
enhancement was not a rationale for the merger, 1 if otherwise), similar dummy variables for 
merger rationales 3-6, dummy variables for industry segment (software, networking), a 
numerical variable for years since 1995, and a numerical variable for years since 1995
2
. Again, 
because dummy variables are relative, we omitted merger rationale 2 from the first set of dummy 
variables and hardware from the second set.       
VI. Results 
A. Cumulative Abnormal Return Significance and Variability  
Table 1. Cumulative Abnormal Return Summary Statistics (rounded to three decimal places)   
 
Like Andrade et al who find slightly negative abnormal returns for acquirers that are not 
statistically significant, we find slightly a slightly negative average cumulative abnormal return 
for acquirers in the computer industry. Further, under three of the four techniques used to 
compute cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers we find these cumulative abnormal returns in 
our dataset are not statistically significant at the five percent level (see appendix 1). Importantly, 
though the index method of computing cumulative abnormal returns gives us a statistically 
significant result at the five percent level, it is only barely statistically significant, having a p-
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value of nearly four percent. Further, we find that targets in our dataset have relatively high 
cumulative abnormal returns and that these returns are highly statistically significant under each 
of the four techniques of computing cumulative abnormal returns (see appendix 1). This result is 
also consistent with Andrade et al’s. The cumulative abnormal return variances for both 
acquirers and targets are low under each of the four calculation techniques and similar to each 
other, illustrating that there is not much variation from the mean in our dataset that needs to be 
explained.  
B. Acquirer Regression Results   
See appendix 2. In general, none of the regression variables we selected have statistically 
significant explanatory power under each of the two sets of regressions. The one exception is 
premium paid, which is marginally significant. It is close to being statistically significant in the 
regressions where we use two-year time interval dummy variables when we compute cumulative 
abnormal returns using an approximate one-year mean return from approximately one year prior 
to the announcement date as our normal return (p-value of approximately 0.10) and when we 
when we compute cumulative abnormal returns using an approximate three-year mean return 
from approximately one year prior to the announcement date (p-value of approximately 0.051). It 
is statistically significant in the regression using two-year time interval dummy variables where 
the cumulative abnormal return is computed using a normal return approximated by the capital 
asset pricing model.   
 The premium is also statistically significant in regressions where time is accounted for 
using years since 1995 and years since 1995
2
 as dependant variables when the independent 
variable, cumulate abnormal return, is computed using an approximate three-year mean return 
from approximately one year prior to the announcement date as the normal return and when it is 
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computed using a capital asset pricing model normal return. In each case the slope of the 
premium is negative, though very close to zero, indicating that the higher the premium paid, the 
lower the short-term value captured by the acquirer. Further, the regression results show very 
low adjusted r-squared values, with r-squared often times being negative. The results for the 
eight acquirer regressions where premium is computed differently do not deviate much from 
these results (see appendix 4). No variables are statistically significant, including premiums in all 
of the regressions. Premiums not being statistically significant under the second calculation 
method was a result we expected given we anticipated that shareholders are more likely to 
calculate premiums using the first method.   
C. Target Regression Results   
See appendix 3. In all eight regressions for targets we find that the marketing dummy 
variable is statistically significant. Further, in the regressions with two-year time interval dummy 
variables we find that the premium received is statistically significant when the cumulative 
abnormal return is computed using an approximate one-year mean return from approximately 
one year prior to the announcement date as the normal return and when it is computed using the 
capital asset pricing model. In the regressions using years since 1995 and years since 1995
2
 as 
numerical variables to account for time, the premium received is statistically significant only 
when the cumulative abnormal return is computed using the capital asset pricing model to derive 
normal returns. In each of the other cases the premium appears to be close to being significant at 
the five percent level (p-values close to 0.05 but not under it). Additionally, though the 
coefficient of the premium is close zero in each of the regressions, it is slightly negative 
illustrating that the higher the premium received by the target, the lower the resulting cumulative 
abnormal return.  
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Further, the 1997-1998 dummy variable is statistically significant in the set of regressions 
with two-year time interval dummy variables when cumulative abnormal returns are computed 
using an approximate one-year mean return from approximately one year prior to the 
announcement date as the normal return. In the others cases within this regression set, this 
variable is close to being statistically significant (p-values close to 0.05 but not under it). None of 
the other variables are statistically significant. Further, the regressions seem to have fairly strong 
explanatory power in certain cases, with adjusted r-squared values reaching as high as 0.59.  
The regressions where premiums were computed according to the second method, where 
they were normalized by the target equity value, do not yield substantially different results (see 
appendix 5). The premium is statistically significant or close to being so in some cases but in 
most it is not. Also the marketing variable is statistically significant in some cases and in 
virtually all of the remaining cases it is close to being so (p-values close to 0.05).  
VIII. Interpretation of Results 
 Generally, we do not find evidence to support any of our various hypotheses. That is, the 
variables that were hypothesized to be contributors to short-term value are generally not 
statistically significant, indicating that these variables are likely not viewed by the market at 
large, at least in the short-term, to be significant generators of value. It must be stressed that this 
does not indicate that these variables are not actual creators of value or profits in the short or 
long-term, only that they are not viewed by the market to be value creators or destroyers in the 
short-term.    
A. Acquirers  
 The results, which are generally invariant to the technique used to compute cumulative 
abnormal returns, show that acquirers in computer industry mergers do not earn statistically 
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significant cumulative abnormal returns in the short-term. Given that this corresponds with 
Andrade et al’s results, we can interpret that, on balance, acquirers in the computer industry are 
not viewed to be able to capture any industry specific benefits we hypothesized may exist to 
create significant positive short-term value for their equity holders. It is not surprising then that 
our regressions yield low adjusted r-squared values and that only a single variable has any iota of 
explanatory merit. In fact, the dearth of variables with statistically significant explanatory power 
can be accounted for by the fact that there are no statistically significant cumulative abnormal 
returns to explain for acquirers in the first place (except in the case where cumulative abnormal 
returns are computed using index returns for normal returns). 
 In certain cases the premium paid by the acquirer is statistically significant or close to 
being so, suggesting that the premium paid by the acquirer is taken into consideration by the 
market to explain short term return variability. However, because the variable is neither 
statistically significant in all cases nor highly statistically significant, it does not seem to have 
major explanatory merit (though it clearly has some). The negative coefficient of the premium 
also follows basic intuition, as acquirers pay more for the firm they are acquiring, they retain less 
value for themselves. Further, the lack of statistical significance among the remaining variables 
is a likely indicator that they are not viewed by the market to be contributors to short-term value 
in mergers and acquisitions undertaken by acquirers.          
B. Targets  
 Happily, the results for targets are also generally invariant to the technique used to 
compute cumulative abnormal returns, indicating their robustness. Average cumulative abnormal 
returns are very high, ranging from approximately 25% to approximately 30% (see table 1) 
depending on the technique used and are highly statistically significant under all of the 
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techniques used to compute cumulative abnormal returns (see appendix 1). This finding, in 
addition to the fact that these returns have low variances, indicates that targets in the computer 
industry, on average, earn large statistically significant positive returns with little variation.  
Our regression results regarding the significance of the marketing variable, indicate that 
when marketing is one of the reasons stated by the acquirer for pursing a merger, short-term 
equity value is created (i.e. marketing has statistically significant explanatory merit with regards 
to explaining cumulative abnormal returns). Product enhancement, increases in size, value chain 
improvement, and new market entry are traditional rationales for engaging in mergers and given 
that they are not statistically significant relative to cost synergies (the omitted dummy variable), 
they are apparently not viewed by the market in the short-term to be significant creators of value. 
One possible explanation of marketing’s statistical significance may have to do with the nature 
of firms in the industry. Firms in the hardware, software, and networking spaces of the computer 
industry may possess various technical competencies in product development, cost cutting, size, 
value chain, and new markets that allow them to create products for which there is demand. 
However, given their devotion to technical competency, such firms may be perceived by the 
market to lack marketing expertise. When an acquirer states that it is acquiring such a firm for its 
marketing capabilities, this information may serve as evidence to the market that the target firm 
possesses marketing capabilities, which other firms like it are perceived to lack. This may serve 
as a signal that the target has a source of unique competitive advantage, leading to positive short-
term cumulative abnormal returns.   
Conversely, an acquirer who acquires a target for marketing reasons may not find the 
marketing variable to be statistically significant for two reasons. First, acquirers generally do not 
earn statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns so there is little for the marketing 
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rationale to explain. Second, even if stating marketing as a rationale for pursuing a merger 
signals to the target firm shareholders that it has a unique competitive advantage, acquirer firm 
shareholders may have doubts about their firm’s ability to effectively integrate that competitive 
advantage into their own firm to create value.     
Our results also show that premium received in certain cases has statistically significant 
explanatory power and in virtually all the remaining cases is close to being statistically 
significant. This indicates that the premium received by the target is an indicator of short term 
value to the market though only a marginal indicator. One interesting result is that in all cases the 
premium received by the target is slightly negative but very close to zero. This means that on 
average, the higher the premium received by the target, the lower the resulting cumulative 
abnormal return for the target. While this result may seem perplexing at first, high premiums 
received may be indicative of something else. Perhaps high premiums are paid for targets that 
have greater competitive advantages and value (i.e. superior management, better product 
development, et cetera). As such, in the event that they do not get any ownership of the merged 
firm (all cash deal), target firm shareholders may prefer not to merge and to rather reap the 
rewards of such competitive advantages well into the future. Alternatively, in the event that they 
do attain ownership in the merged firm, they may be skeptical about the merged firm’s ability to 
uphold the target’s competitive advantage(s). These potential detriments that may be associated 
with a higher premium received may outweigh the benefit of receiving a higher premium.  
Further, in the regressions with two-year time intervals, the 1997-1998 time interval is 
statistically significant when cumulative abnormal returns are computed using normal returns 
that involve taking the mean daily return from approximately two years before the announcement 
date to approximately one year before the announcement date. In all of the other cases in this 
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regression set the 1997-1998 time interval was not statistically significant though it came close to 
being so (p-values close to 0.05). This may signal that the boom years of 1997 and 1998 
positively impacted mergers and acquisitions cumulative abnormal returns, given that the slope 
is positive in each case, though that impact was not large. Additionally, the fact that none of the 
other variables were statistically significant indicates that they do not have statistically 
significant explanatory power over cumulative abnormal returns in targets.  
IX. Motivations for Future Analysis 
 Many of the variables that we hypothesized would have explanatory merit, did not end up 
doing so. As such, future analysis may attempt to identify variables that explain some of the 
variation that we have left unexplained. Additionally, for the variables that we have found to 
have explanatory merit, future analysis may attempt to diagnose the sources of that merit. For 
example, we have speculated why the marketing variable may have a high degree of statistical 
significance. Future research may find evidentiary justification for the possible explanations we 
have offered. Finally, we have explained the statistical complexities of performing a long-term 
analysis of value due to the succession of merger and acquisition activity that persists in the 
industry.  Future researchers may attempt to perform such an analysis.  
X. Conclusion 
 Prior researchers have found that mergers and acquisitions, on balance, do not create 
statistically significant abnormal returns over the short term for acquirers while they do create 
statistically significant positive abnormal returns for targets. In our analysis we hypothesized that 
this result may not hold for acquirers in the computer industry, given the industry’s unique 
features that we thought may provide acquirers with additional sources of value in mergers and 
acquisitions that they pursue. Additionally, after identifying certain value creating attributes 
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present in the computer industry based on previous research, we hypothesized that mergers that 
are pursued with a desire to attain or enhance these attributes would on balance create greater 
short-term value than mergers that are not aimed at taking advantage of such attributes. We also 
hypothesized that mergers undertaken for diversification purposes in the software sector of the 
computer industry would create more short-term value, on average, than mergers undertaken for 
these purposes in other segments.  
 To test these hypotheses we began by defining our dependent variable, cumulative 
abnormal returns with a twenty-day event window (the event being the announcement of each 
merger in our dataset) pursuant to the event study methodology. For robustness, we 
approximated normal returns, or hypothetical returns that would have persisted in the absence of 
the merger using four different techniques. Given that the normal return is an input into the 
cumulative abnormal return calculation, this gave us four sets of cumulative abnormal returns for 
targets and for acquirers. We then ran two sets of regressions with various independent variables 
against each cumulative abnormal return set for targets and for acquirers. Also for robustness 
sake we ran each set of regressions again using an alternate method of computing premiums paid 
by acquirers and received by targets and found that this did not materially affect our results. We 
focused our analysis on the sixteen regressions using the primary method for calculating 
premiums, given we believe that it is the more academically correct method for the purposes of 
this study.    
 Given this focus, our results revealed that acquirers generally do not earn statistically 
significant cumulative abnormal returns while targets do earn large, positive, statistically 
significant cumulative abnormal returns. This result is consistent with the aforementioned 
findings of prior researchers. As such, it seems that acquirers in the computer industry, on 
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balance, are not able to attain greater short-term value from mergers and acquisitions than are 
acquirers across a basket of industries. Targets, on the other hand, are able to capture significant 
short-term value from mergers and acquisitions in the computer industry as are targets across a 
basket of industries. Additionally, our regression results are generally invariant to the cumulative 
abnormal return calculation technique used and hence generally robust.  
For acquirers we find that the only variable that has serious explanatory merit is the 
premium they pay for targets, given that it is either statistically significant or close to being so in 
some of the regressions. None of the other variables are statistically significant. This result is not 
surprising for acquirers given the finding that there generally are no statistically significant 
cumulative abnormal returns to explain in the first place. For targets, which do have statistically 
significant cumulative abnormal returns to explain, we find that the premium plays a similar 
explanatory role to the role it played in explaining acquirer cumulative abnormal returns. 
Further, the dummy variable for marketing is generally statistically significant for targets, 
illustrating that when the acquirer states that marketing is one of the rationales for undertaking a 
given merger, that rationale is viewed by the market to be a significant short-term creator of 
value. In the regressions with two-year time interval dummies the 1997-1998 variable seems to 
have marginal statistical significance for targets, perhaps reflecting the positive economic 
conditions persisting at the time. Future analysis may attempt to discover factors that better 
explain cumulative abnormal returns, provide explanations for why the variables we identified as 
having explanatory merit do have this merit, and extend our analysis to the long run.        
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XII. Appendices    
Appendix 1. Cumulative Abnormal Return Tests of Statistical Significance  
 
We test for significance using a paired, two-tailed t-test. We use each of the cumulative 
abnormal returns as the first dataset and compare the against the expected cumulative abnormal 
return which would have persisted had the merger had no abnormal return impact (hence E[No 
Impact] is zero). For acquirers cumulative abnormal returns are statistically significant only 
under the index method of computing cumulative abnormal returns. For targets, cumulative 
abnormal returns are all highly statistically significant and invariant to the cumulative abnormal 
return calculation technique used (see target results on next page).  
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Appendix 2. Acquirer Regression Results – First Premium Calculation Method 
Regressions with Two-Year Time Intervals 
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Appendix 3. Target Regression Results – First Premium Calculation Method 
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Appendix 4. Acquirer Regression Results – Second Premium Calculation Method 
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Appendix 5. Target Regression Results – Second Premium Calculation Method 
Regressions with Two-Year Time Intervals 
One-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 52 
Three-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 53 
Capital Asset Pricing Model Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 54 
Index Method Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55 
Regressions with Years since 1995 and Years since 1995
2
  
One-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56 
Three-Year Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 57 
Capital Asset Pricing Model Cumulative Abnormal Return Technique 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58 
Index Method Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 59 
References 
Adobe Completes Acquisition of Macromedia. Press Release 5 December 2005.
 <http://www.adobe.com/aboutadobe/pressroom/pressreleases/pdfs/200512/120505Adobe
 AcquiresMacromedia.pdf> [cited 1 April 2009]. 
 
Adobe to acquire Macromedia.
 <http://www.adobe.com/aboutadobe/invrelations/adobeandmacromedia.html> [cited 1
 April 2009].  
 
Adobe to acquire Macromedia. Press Release 18 April 2005.
 <http://www.adobe.com/aboutadobe/invrelations/pdfs/AdobeAcquiresMacromedia.pdf>
 [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Akhigbe, Aigbe and Anna D. Martin. 2002. Do Microsoft Acquisitions Benefit the Computer
 Industry? Financial Analysts Journal 58: 19-27.  
     
Andrade, Gregor, Mark Mitchell and Erik Stafford. 2001. New Evidence and Perspectives on
 Mergers. Journal of Economic Perspectives 15: 103-120.   
 
Armitage, Seth. 1995. Event Study Methods and Evidence on their Performance. Journal of
 Economic Surveys 9: 25-52. 
 
Bayus, Barry L., Gary Erickson and Robert Jacobson. 2003. The Financial Rewards of New
 Product Introductions in the Personal Computer Industry. Management Science 49: 197
 210. 
 
BMC Software Completes Acquisition of Marimba, Inc. Press Release 15 July 2004.
 <http://www.bmc.com/corporate/nr2004/071504_1.html> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
BMC Software to Acquire Marimba, Inc. Press Release 29 April 2004.
 <http://www.bmc.com/corporate/nr2004/042904_2.html> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Bothner, Matthew S. 2005. Relative size and firm growth in the global computer industry.  
 Industrial and Corporate Change 14: 617-638. 
 
Bowman, Robert G. 1983. Understanding and Conducting Event Studies. Journal of Finance and
 Accounting 10: 561-584. 
 
Bresnahan, Timothy F. and Shane Greenstein. 1999. Competition and the Structure of the
 Computer Industry. The Journal of Industrial Economics 47: 1-40.  
 
CA Completes Netegrity Acquisition Advancing its Security Management Strategy. Press
 Release 24 November 2004.
 <http://www.ca.com/us/content/campaign.aspx?CID=132349> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
 60 
Cisco Announces Agreement to Acquire WebEx. Press Release 15 March 2007. 
 <http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2007/corp_031507b.html> [cited 1 April 2009]. 
 
Cisco Systems Completes Acquisition of Latitude Communications. Press Release 12 January
 2004. <http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2004/corp_011204.html> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Cisco Completes Acquisition of WebEx. Press Release 29 May 2007.
 <http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2007/corp_052907.html> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Cisco Systems, Inc. Announces Agreement to Acquire Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. Press Release 18
 November 2005. <http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2005/corp_111805.html> [cited 1
 April 2009].  
 
Cisco Systems Completes Acquisition of Scientific-Atlanta. Press Release 27 February 2006.
 <http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2006/corp_022706.html> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Cisco Systems to Acquire Latitude Communications. Press Release 12 November 2003.
 <http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/corp_111203.html> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Compaq Computer Corporation 8-K filing. 27 January 1998.
 <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/714154/0000714154-98-000002.txt> [cited 1
 April 2009]. 
 
Computer Associates International, Inc. 425 filing. 14 February 2000.
 <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/356028/0000356028-00-000004.txt> [cited 1
 April 2009].  
 
Computer Associates International, Inc. 10-Q filing. 3 August 2000.
 <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/356028/000035602800000023/0000356028-
 00-000023-0001.txt> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Cram, Don. The Event Study Webpage. http://web.mit.edu/doncram/www/eventstudy.html
 [cited 1 April 2009]  
 
Cross, Mark L., Wallace N. Davidson III and John H. Thornton. 1988. Taxes, Stock Returns and
 Captive Insurance Subsidiaries. The Journal of Risk and Insurance. 55: 331-338.  
 
CSC Completes Acquisition of Covansys. News Release 2 July 2007.
 <http://www.csc.com/newsroom/press_releases/3255-
 csc_completes_acquisition_of_covansys> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
CSC Completes Merger with MYND Corporation. News Release 27 December 2000.
 <http://www.csc.com/financial_services/press_releases/4040-
 csc_completes_merger_with_mynd_corporation> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
 61 
CSC to Acquire Covansys for $34.00 per share. News Release 25 April 2007.
 <http://www.csc.com/newsroom/press_releases/1811-
 csc_to_acquire_covansys_for_34_00_per_share> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
CSC to Acquire MYND, Formerly Policy Management Systems: Acquisition to enhance CSC’s
 Product and Service Offerings. News Release 20 June 2000. 
 <http://www.csc.com/financial_services/press_releases/4029-
 csc_to_acquire_mynd_formerly_policy_management_systems_acquisition_to_enhance_c
 sc_s_product_and_service_offerings> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Dignan, Larry. 2000. CA buys Sterling for $4bn. ZDNet.co.uk, 16 February
 <http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/0,1000000097,2077022,00.htm> [cited 1 August 2009].  
 
Duysters, Geert and John Hagedoorn. 2001. Do Company Strategies and Structures Converge in
 Global Markets? Evidence from the Computer Industry. Journal of International
 Business Studies 32: 347-356. 
 
English, Simon and Ian Cave. 2001. HP Buys Compaq in $25bn deal.
 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2732673/HP-buys-Compaq-in-25bn-deal.html>
 [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Fisher, Dennis. 2004. CA to Acquire Netegrity for $430 Million. eWeek.com, 6 October
 <http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/CA-to-Acquire-Netegrity-for-430-Million/> [cited
 1 April 2009] 
 
Fried, Ian. 2002. HP Closes Book on Compaq Deal. CNET News 3 May
 <http://news.cnet.com/2100-1001-898887.html?tag=mncol;txt> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
French, Kenneth R. Kenneth R. French – Data Library.
 <http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html> [cited 1
 April 2009]. 
 
Henderson Jr., Glenn V. 1990. Problems and Solutions in Conducting Event Studies. The
 Journal of Risk and Insurance 57: 282-206.  
 
Hewlett-Packard and Compaq agree to merge, creating $87 billion global technology leader.
 News Release 3 September 2001.
 <http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/press/2001/010904a.html> [cited 1April 2009].  
 
HP Closes Compaq Merger. News Release 3 May 2002.
 <http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/press/2002/020503a.html> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
HP completes $1.29 billion merger with VeriFone; VeriFone becomes HP subsidiary. Business
 Wire. 25 June 1997
 <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_1997_June_25/ai_19535079/> [cited 1
 April 2009]. 
 62 
 
HP Completes Acquisition of Convex Computer. Business Wire, 20 December 1995 
 <http://www.allbusiness.com/banking-finance/financial-markets-investing
 securities/7194547-1.html> [cited 1 April 2009].   
 
HP to Acquire Convex Computer. Business Wire, 21 September 1995
 <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_1995_Sept_21/ai_17453733> [cited 1
 April 2009]. 
 
IBM and Informix Corp. Sign Agreement for Sale of Informix Database Business to IBM. Press
 Release 24 April 2001. <http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/1296.wss>
 [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Ibm Announces Offer To Acquire Lotus Development Corporation For $60 Per Lotus Share In
 Cash. Business Wire. 5 June 1995.
 <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_1995_June_5/ai_16980847/> [cited 1
 April 2009].  
 
IBM Completes Acquisition of Informix Database Assets. Press Release 2 July 2001. 
 <http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/1174.wss> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
IBM Completes Acquisition of Micromuse Inc. Press Release 15 February 2006. <http://www-
 03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/19247.wss> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
IBM Finalizes Lotus Acquisition. CNET News. 6 July 1995. <http://news.cnet.com/IBM
 Finalizes-Lotus-Acquisition/2100-1033_3-205502.html> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
IBM to Acquire Micromuse Inc. Press Release 21 December 2005. < http://www-
 03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/19066.wss> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
International Business Machines Corporation 8-K Filing. 21 February 2003.
 <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/51143/000104746903006346/a2104164z8k
 .htm> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Jarrell, Greg A., James A. Brickley and Jeffry M. Netter. 1988. The Market for Corporate
 Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2: 49-
 68. 
 
Jenson, Michael C. and Richard S. Ruback. 1983. The Market for Corporate Control: The
 Scientific Evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 11: 5-50.   
 
Lacey, Nelson J. 1988. Recent Evidence on the Liability Crisis. The Journal of Risk and
 Insurance 55: 499-508. 
 
 63 
Lotus Development Corporation SC 14D1 Filing. 5 July 1995.
 <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/711761/0000950112-95-001563.txt> [cited 1
 April 2009].  
 
Lotus Development Corporation SC 14D1/A Filing. 5 July 1995.
 <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/711761/0000950157-95-000197.txt> [cited 1
 April 2009].  
 
MacDonald, Christine and Tim Clark. 1997. HP swipes VeriFone in Stock Deal. CNET News, 23
 April <http://news.cnet.com/HP-swipes-VeriFone-in-stock-deal/2100-1001_3-
 279131.html> [cited 1 April 2009]. 
 
MacKinlay, Craig A. 1997. Event Studies in Economics and Finance. Journal of Economic
 Literature 35: 13-39. 
 
Microsoft Completes Acquisition of aQuantive, Creates Advertiser and Publisher Solutions
 Group. Press Release 13 August 2007.
 <http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2007/aug07/08-13MSaQuantivePR.mspx>
 [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Microsoft to Acquire aQuantive, Inc. Press Release 18 May 2007.
 <http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2007/may07/05-18advertising.mspx> [cited
 1 April 2009].  
 
Oracle Agrees to Buy Siebel for $10.66 a Share. Press Release 12 September 2005.
 <http://www.oracle.com/corporate/press/2005_sep/monrls.html> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Oracle Buys Enterprise Performance Management Leader Hyperion. Press Release 1 March
 2007. <http://search.ca.com/search/ca?style=en&qt=press%20releases&col=> [cited 1
 April 2009].  
 
Oracle Buys MetaSolv Software. Press Release 23 October 2006.
 <http://www.oracle.com/corporate/press/2006_oct/oracle_metasolv.htm> [cited 1 April
 2009].  
 
Oracle Buys Product Lifecycle Management Leader Agile. Press Release 15 May 2007.
 <http://www.oracle.com/corporate/press/2007_may/agile.html> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Oracle Corporation 10-Q Filing. 25 September 2006.
 <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1341439/000119312506196503/d10q.htm>
 [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Oracle Corporation 10-Q Filing. 26 September 2007.
 <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1341439/000095013407020490/f33605e10vq.
 htm> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
 64 
Oracle-Metasolv Overview and Frequently Asked Questions.
 <http://www.oracle.com/metasolv/oracle-metasolv-faq.pdf> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Pre-merger Compaq Reaps Significant Gains Overseas in Storage Market Share. News Release
 4 June 2002. <http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/newsroom/press/2002/020604c.html> [cited 1
 April 2009]. 
 
Schultz, Randy. 1998. Compaq to Buy DEC. CNN Money.com, 26 January 
 <http://money.cnn.com/1998/01/26/technology/compaq/> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Software Industry Leaders Symantec and VERITAS Software To Merge. News Release 16
 December 2004. <http://www.symantec.com/press/2004/n041216.html> [cited 1 April
 2009].  
 
Symantec Completes Acquisition of Altiris. Press Release 9 April 2007.
 <http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20070409_01> [cited 1
 April 2009]. 
 
Symantec Completes Acquisition of Bindview. Press Release 9 January 2006.
 <http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20060109_01> [cited 1
 April 2009].  
 
Symantec Completes On Technology Acquisition. Press Release 17 February 2004.
 <http://www.symantec.com/press/2004/n040217.html> [1 April 2009].  
 
Symantec Corporation 10-Q filing. 10 August 2005.
 <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/849399/000095013405015539/f11063e10vq.ht
 m> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Symantec to Acquire Altiris. Press Release 29 January 2007.
 <http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20070129_02> [cited 1
 April 2009].  
 
Symantec to Acquire Bindview. Press Release 3 October 2005.
 <http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20051003_02> [1 April
 2009].  
 
Symantec to Acquire ON Technology. Press Release 27 October 2003.
 <http://www.symantec.com/press/2003/n031027a.html> [1 April 2009].  
 
Taft, Darryl K. 2004. IBM-Rational Merger Pays Off. eWeek.com, 29 March
 <http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Web-Services-Web-20-and-SOA/IBMRational-Merger-      
Pays-Off/> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
Vanderhei, Jack L. 1987. The Effect of Voluntary Termination of Overfunded Pension Plans on
 Shareholder Wealth. The Journal of Risk and Insurance 54: 131-156.  
 65 
 
Wharton Research Data Services. <http://wrds.wharton.upenn.edu/> [cited 1 April 2009].   
 
Yahoo Finance. <http://finance.yahoo.com/> [cited 1 April 2009].  
 
 
 
 
